This study focuses on how civil militias in Banten and Lampung do their persistence in society. Civil militias play significant role in society not only as being intermediaries between civil societies themselves and the government, but also as a mediator between the different political levels of society: In addition, the existence of martial arts groups give contributions as initiation bases for the activist masses. This study on civil militias also shows how political parallel networks compete for power, beyond the parties and political chairs.
Introduction
In Indonesia 2 , many anthropological and socio-political specialists have reported that nowadays in most provinces, society is deeply structured by a number of more or less institutionalized paramilitary, criminal and vigilante groups 3 . Other kinds of semi-formal groups also interact and compete in the political scene, like lobby-style political intermediaries 4 and various types of local strongmen networks 5 . Regional and national-scales oligarchies seem to be at the center of these groups' resilience and constraints 6 , but the elites who happen to be labeled as "reformist" also have to deal with these actors, due to their involvement in a wide semi-institutionalized system of arrangements and its geographical position between Jakarta and Sumatra, Banten is a very strategic region for Indonesian development projects, while Lampung, as a transmigration area, has numerous and complex constellations of authority networks. Therefore, a comparative study is interesting to carry out in regard to the geographical proximity of the regions, the shared history, the prevalence of informal political networks and also the significant organization of power in both provinces.
There is a vast amount of social science research about the semi-legal networks' State entrenchment. But the inclusion of these groups into wider political spheres situated at various levels of both State and society is less documented. I will try to show that in Banten's and Lampung's cases, the power set in which social and political elite evolve encompasses altogether State institutions, politico-economic and social organizations, as well as local authority institutions defined here as encompassing local religious personalities (ustadz, ulama, syekh and kiai) and ritual initiation -including the therapeutics and fighting techniques of the martial arts (silat) and invulnerability practices (debus) 12 -masters (guru and sesepuh). This extended set of sociopolitical actors forms in several means informal and personalized networks that are parallel to the State while interacting and interpenetrating with it. It then does not only mirror or shadow the State 15 ; it does compose what I call "parallel political networks". It appears that our knowledge of the transversal dimension of this kind of networks is thin and needs to be improved for a better understanding of political Indonesian issues.
To examine these questions I will briefly present how power is regionally conceived and enacted. In a second step, I will describe the main historical evolutions undergone by the local authority networks' position into the power sphere. We will then examine the role of martial arts organizations as interfaces in the local distribution of power. These groups are at the center of civil militias that gather political parties, bureaucracy and civil society. Finally, I will comment the ideological repertoires mobilized by the civil militias' actors and the way their discourses are locally regarded.
Conceptions of power in Banten and Lampung
Due to the religious dimension of power relations in Southeast Asian societies, and particularly in Indonesia, 13 the study of politics in the Archipelago leads to anthropological considerations concerning the conception of power. This perspective underlines the question of the relational and hierarchical dimensions of power. This aspect is particularly prevalent considering the main power figures in Banten and Lampung: the religious leaders named kiai and the strongmen called jawara. Kiai are the heads of the Muslim boarding schools pesantren and they exert strong influence upon the local communities. Many of them appear to be close to Mecca networks -Banten had the most important figures concerning the pilgrimage to Mecca (Hajj) at the end of the 19 th -beginning of the 20 th centuries and many kiai taught at Masjid al-Haram in Mecca. In the XIX th century, they also developed their own Sufi practices, under the local brotherhood Qadiriyah wa Naqsbandiyah.
14 Jawara are the masters of the martial initiations called silat. They endeavor four dimensions of power. First, they master techniques of physical protection and they practice a set of rituals that enable them to channel an energy called eusi(s.), that is from divine origin, is invisible and supra-mundane. This energy can be concentrated in a place (then called kramatan), an object (then known as pusaka), an animal or a person (who is then told sakti). It can also circulate: it is not only channeled, reinforced and ritually transferred; it can also be transmitted through descent and kinship. It can provide its owner the capacities of invulnerability, invincibility, invisibility, ubiquity, or longevity. These faculties are markers of a sacred force (kasékten).
This channeling is also a source of acquisition of some know-how, particularly ritual ones. I have extensively documented the purification ritual called keceran that is practiced in hundreds of martial initiation schools in Banten and Lampung 15 . During keceran, all the initiates gather, recite collective Muslim prayers, enunciate political discourses, perform martial dances and fights and summon protective ancestors' entities to be possessed. Possession enables them to obtain signs that will be collectively interpreted regarding the agrarian practices, economical decisions, political strategies and social practices. The heart of the ritual consists of the sprinkling of purification water in the eyes of the initiates by the master. Keceran provides violence a subordinate place in a values order where religious aspects are prevalent, particularly the link to martial and invulnerability initiations, the relation with protective spirits and ancestors, the affiliation to the religious Islamic boarding schools pesantren and the connection to local Sufi brotherhoods, namely Qadiriyah wa Naqsbandiyah in Banten and Rifaiah in Lampung. Keceran also indicates the preeminence of intergenerational and ancestry links: the relations between elder and younger, the reference to founding ancestors, the importance of brotherhoods' and rulers' genealogies. Finally, this ritual values the locality through the reference and pilgrimages to cosmological and mystical centers. The persons able to concentrate this energy in an expert way develop a set of systemic esoteric knowledge that are categorized under the term elmu(s.). This knowledge power is the ownership of the saints, magicians, sorcerers, and sovereigns who are considered as sacred kings and jawara. Jawara are well known to be skillful in mastering elmu 16 in such a way that they can use it to reach the Unity of Being (wahdat al-wujud), as this one is conceived in the local religious variations, and particularly in their Sufi form. Elmu determines the legitimacy of the jawarato held the functions of initiation masters, as well as the role of religious and ritual officers for the villages' and neighborhoods' communities. It also provides them a reputation that spread far beyond their living localities. This fame is the base of a legitimacy that produces consent and from which the jawara embody a status of authority (s.wibawa). Authority is designed here as the capacity to influence others, and eventually to command obedience. In return, its owner has several obligations toward the community he influences. Further, the members of the community spontaneously collaborate together to serve the collective objectives carried out by the authority representative.
Moreover, as the leaders of martial initiation practices, jawara embody a potential of the population's mobilization and a capacity of coercion. It led them to interact with the different governments that succeeded all along Banten's and Lampung's history. The progressive Dutch colonial occupation positioned a number of these authority figures as political intermediaries. In the course of the Indonesian national construction on the XIX th century several jawara became the region's main political actors. Reciprocally, the legitimacy provided by silat initiation as a base of power led many political representatives to be initiated to silat or to take representation functions within the initiation schools. Then, the frontiers between the initiation groups and the political institutions are fluid and porous because there is a crossed implication of the respective agents in both these two fields of social life. In this context, the practices and imaginaries of physical coercion that are embodied by the jawara participate to the articulation -both at the level of practices and ideas -of their authority status and their political functions. The convertibility that exists between these different dimensions of power contributes to the constitution of an original form of power that I propose to identify with the notion of "strength". Thus, this power dimension embodied by the jawara leads me to define them as "strongmen". The position of jawara in Banten's and Lampung's societies have endured deep transformations in the course of the regional histories and so did the different dimensions of power that are sacred force, religious authority, political functions and strength through a coercion capital.
Historical transformation of the regional power networks
At Lampung's pepper devaluated and reconfigured this working migration organization. It reinforced the difficulties for both populations and widened the recruitment scope of the socio political militant movements. Apart from the idealist collaboration between kiai and jawara toward the practices of purification (under the label jihad), brigands and criminals also formed part of the militant movements. In 1942, the Japanese occupation provided the underworld its first taste of the opportunities offered by major political change 23 . The relationship between state and criminals was also ambiguous during the struggle for Indonesian independence in 1945-1949. After independence, Banten's regional representative, the Resident Achmad Chatib, was a prominent jawara and the administration was mainly formed by jawara and kiai. They became a main concern for the President Sukarno's government as some of them composed the ranks of the separatist Islamist movement of Darul Islam. At the same time, others helped the local divisions of the army to fight these opponents. In Lampung also, Darul Islam spread, apparently with connections to Bantenese Islamist groups. These connections lasted for decades and some are still prevalent nowadays in someclaimed and real -transnational jihadist movements As religious leaders represented the strongest local power under President Suharto's New Order regime, the government appointed a jawara' leader, Chasan Sochib, to work together with the army and government officials from the capital, Jakarta. He had helped his father to develop a rice business between Banten and Lampung and in 1969-1970 he sold cloves from Lampung in Banten. In both regions he was close to the jawara networks and was then provided the task of unifying the religious forces, which were composed by Islamic schools (the pesantren of Mathla'ul Anwar, close to Nadlatul Ulama, and the modernist madrasah of Al Khaeriyah) and prominent Islamic leaders. They were pressured by the regime's political organ, Golkar. The organization in charge of this co-optation, the Ulamas' work unit (Satuan Karya Ulama, Satkar Ulama), worked together with national institutions, like the Indonesian Ulema Council (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, MUI). Chasan Sochib later created the organization PPPSBBI (also known as Pendekar Banten) in 1971. Through the extended jawara network he developed in this organization, Sochib managed to rule the informal power relations during three decades. After Reformasi, the two mandates held by Chasan Sochib's elder daughter, Atut Chosiyah, as governor and the vice-governor position held by the son of Atut Chosiyah since 2017 add to extensive politico-economical monopolies and indicate a strong resilience the so-called Chasan Sochib's "dynasty" 25 . In this power panorama, counter powers are effectively co-opted under the game of political coalitions and economical arrangements. As for Lampung, the power panorama seems to be more contrasted. The seven million inhabitants count a large part of migrants' descendants from Java, Madura and Bali who arrived through the transmigration program that started at the beginning of the 20 th century of the initiative of the Dutch colonial government. The region obtained the province status in 1964 and developed its own local political dynamics but during Suharto era it still endured the influenceof some Bantenese strongmen and political actors. The region also indicates the important role of Bantenese entrepreneurs, particularly in the agricultural sector -it counts for around thirty nine percents of the economy, mainly with productions of coffee, rice, corn, sugar cane, pepper and cows cattle. Banten's influence is also indicated by the activity of strong militia style organizations that act as political brokers and maintained until recently the position of Bantenese leaders as political and economical intermediaries between Lampung, the capital Jakarta and Java.
The martial arts groups as crossroads in the distribution of power Since the so-called Reformasi era following the fall of President Suharto in 1998, the setting up of decentralization and regional autonomy laws, links between civil society and political institutions have been reshaped at the national level. Transformations particularly touched the "community organizations" (Organisasi Masyarakat, Ormas), that are deep rooted in local communities and benefited from reforms that increased their action capacity. Whereas some of those organizations are widely independent from State's control, others are deeply institutionalized at the regional levels, dealing with provincial governments, political parties and the main religious institutions.
Since they have membership in political instances, they can rely on women, youth, social and humanitarian organizations to unify political support forces or to promote their political actions. For example, in Jakarta, local citizens and politics have to deal with underworld Jakartanese and Bantenese organizations when facing the displacing of populations victims of flooding and State's expropriations. Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam, FPI) is currently the more prominent organization that plays this role. It was originally an alliance of petty thugs (preman) that presented itself as an Islamist vigilante group and progressively positioned as a power broker, as it was recently illustrated through the national level demonstrations it coordinated (in October, November and December 2016). In Padang, Aceh and Jogjakarta, such organizations have strong roles in crisis and catastrophes management. My own observations in Banten highlight that humanitarian organizationssuch as the Red Cross, Taruna Siaga Bencana(Tagana) and Karang Taruna 26 -are politically oriented both at the departmental and provincial levels. For instance, their funds are used to organize political events prior to election campaigns. During Suharto era in Banten, it is PPPSBBI that played the central role of power distribution within the organizations' panorama. It was a crossroads of a large variety of violent groups -ranging from gangs to civil militias' style organizations -, through a game of multiple affiliations. Because of its link to silat and invulnerability (debus) schools it represented a coercion tool and the threat/use of violence successfully enabled it to guarantee Golkar's winning at every levels of the elections. By having its members as representatives in the local parliament, Pendekar Banten has a quasi monopole of construction projects in the region. It takes part in industrial affairs in the biggest Southeast Asian steelworks site of Krakatau Steel that was chosen for its proximity with steel field (which quality was overestimated, what provoked the first promoters' indebtedness). PB also influences the main development projects decisions, like the Sunda straight bridge project. The governors of Banten and Lampung discussed of this project with Tomy Winata, the businessman close to the military interests. They met in the 2010's in one of his luxury hotels in Jakarta and later on his yacht, together with the spokesman and legislative council member for Golkar's Banten branch, Adi Surya Dharma.
Moreover, PB is represented in Lampung, where it claims to have a membership of 120 000 persons and 26 associations (paguyuban) 27 , from Under these backings, in Jakarta and the close urban regions of the Jabodetabek (composed of Jakarta Bogor, Depok, Tangerang and Bekasi cities), numerous silat schools, labeled as Betawi (the people who are locally considered to originate from the capital), have formed their own paramilitarygangster style organizations. It was the case for the Betawi Brotherhood Forum (Forum Betawi Rempug, FBR) and the Children of Betawi Communication Forum (Forum Komunikasi Anak Betawi, Forkabi) in the first decade of Reformasi. More recently, local formations appeared following the mass demonstrations against Jakarta's governor, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (called Ahok), like Brigade 411, an organization under FPI's tutelary. These organizations can mobilize mass support for political parties and in return they obtain the direction of development projects and the right to exert racket protection in urban territories. These organizations are more or less The central role of civil militias to gather political parties, bureaucracy and civil society.
Rooted in the colonial period, patrimonial networks have reinforced their structures after independence. In the same way that they were affected by the State construction, they influenced the process of its formation. They contributed to form what Schulte Nordholt has called a « Shadow State » that coexists with bureaucratic institutions, is integrated in the State's structures and in which bureaucrats, businessmen, stakeholders and politicians exert their activities in common networks. Since Reformasi, decentralization, successive political instabilities and the privatization of public owns -with the notable phenomenon of the loss of power of the army and the diminution of its State funding, which caused a massive privatization of the security sector 36 strongly modified the force relations between public institutions and traditional networks of authority. This process resulted in the increase of security groups' autonomy 37 and it modified their status towards the State, passing from official integrated entities in the administrative hierarchy of the New Order, to multiform structures in the post-Suharto era. Most of their leaders are former officials of the army and the police, businessmen of huge groups founded under Suharto, but the civil militias' networks offer extremely diverse combinations, from private groups to institutionalized organizations. For example, I have shown that in West Java, Jakarta et Lampung, the patron-client relations between security groups, institutions and enterprises are much more fragmented than during the New Order, whereas in Banten, where the power keeps a very centralized dimension, the traditional networks of the criminality and the underworld have enhanced their institutionalization and a phenomenon of hyper centralization. The considerations on the new dynamics that have emerged since Reformasi help to understand some mechanisms of political affiliation, which can seem at first sight contradictory. With the free elections system and the emergence of parties, "Community organizations" have gained independence from the Golkar's central board. Some have kept the direction of its regional's branches, but most of the candidates multiply their affiliations to diverse parties, like PPP or PDIP. They mobilize coalition mechanisms tactically, on very short term and according to electoral conjunctures. They also use new methods to gain mass votes. From the violence and coercive methods which prevailed under the New Order, they have adopted the distribution of gifts, devices of support and lobbying, money politics, the use of bureaucracy and Medias, cooptation of intellectuals, scientists and students networks. They have taken the direction of women, youth, humanitarian and organizations to diffuse an image of promotion of social and philanthropic actions.
The sanctions-gifts system exerted upon the administrative body, the financial dependence of the education and information of sectors have prevented the emergence of a strong and politically educated middle class. Thus, if decentralization and the multiparty system have increased the role of civil society in political life, they have in the same time permitted the integration of local informal networks in the State apparatus and the intra regional recentralization of the power. It has favored -mainly in the first part of the decentralization process -the rise of identity ideologies, as well as the politicization of nationalist, ethnical and religious groups which were kept out of the political scene before 38 . It has led to the use of self relatives' monopolistic strategies as a way to centralize power, which efficacy is reinforced by the plural direction functions that adopt their members. Thus, huge structural problems prevent the full consolidation of democracy and its benefits for civil society. The persistence and reinforcement of centralistic regional elites is one of the main concerns 39 . These ones are characterized by the weakness of executive power, inequalities for electoral campaigns, the weak role of civil society and women in political affairs, nepotism practices in the governments, the parliaments and the parties. Then, one of the main challenges to consolidate democracy relies on the restructuration of the executive which would guarantees the integrity of the judiciary system. Social mobility is another indicator of the democratization process. It may be stimulated through a fair educative system, the transparence of nominations in the education sector and in the competitive examination for the integration in the public service. The rise of civil society's role in Indonesian society will also be linked with the favoring of Medias' independence and the disposal for a fair access to the political sphere and its tools of diffusion.
But another key aspect to strengthen the participation of civil society to politics that benefit to the common good is a wider socio-historical perspective. This process is largely blocked by one sided actors, mainly the inheritors of the New Order's regime, and it adds to a rewriting of Indonesia's history. With the wide use of social media and the high image circulation it favors, the rehistoricization phenomenon appears as a major political convector.
Civil militias' legitimating references: religion and ethnicity
To understand the ideology shaped and mobilized by civil militias' leaders to legitimate their political positions, we are led to examine the historic evolution of the other main power pole in Banten and Lampung that is political Islam. Indeed, while during the New Order the religious organizations were effectively controlled, repressed or co-opted, with Reformasi many Islamic groups re-emerge as potential political forces. In the first years of Reformasi, the rise of Muslim Brotherhood oriented party, the Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS), illustrated the changing continuities of Islamic networks. Another aspect of this evolution was marked by the militancy movements for Islamic law, Sharia. In Banten, some laws were examined by the provincial parliament in 2000-2001 and in 2002, EMS, Chasan Sochib's former right hand, founded the Preparatory committee for the Islamic law's application in Banten (Panitia Penerapan Pelaksanaan Syariat Islam Banten, P3SIB). He used his position in the editorial board of the radical journal Sabili to promote his action 40 . As for Lampung, several members of TTKDH's direction board used their position in the Islamic modernist Muhammadiyah organization.
In the same period, Banten and Lampung also witnessed the civil militias' instrumentalization of religious radicalism as a way of reinforcing legitimacy over the political Islamic community. EMS urged Bantenese to prepare for jihad in Ambon and notorious Muslim leaders indicated proximity with the terrorist organization Jemaah Islamiyah. The actions of Imam Samudra, one of the Bali bombings' main organizers, had a very favorable echo in a large part of the population in a period in which liberalization and the opening to foreign investments and influences created public anxiety. In that time, while PB's monopolies in the economic and security sector was partly threatened by several personalities from the military Special Forces, Kopassus, the organization approached radical groups like Front Hizbullah, headed by Cecep Busthomi, one of the FPI's founders. Pendekar Banten also successfully infiltrated the semi-governmental MUI and achieved to counter a fatwa that aimed to prohibit debus practice.
After the 2005 "conservative turn", as this period was labeled by Bruinessen and contributors 41 Apart from religious arguments, the local features that were instrumentalized were ethnicity and regionalism. They were particularly used at the beginning of Reformasi, and more recently they begun to emerge again as political levers. A first factor of this references mobilization was decentralization. The lack of supra regional control by the recently decentralized State facilitated collaborations between regional organizations. In Jakarta suburbs, Bantenese groups shared territories with FBR, Forkabi and Pemuda Pancasila. In Lampung, many youth in the rural areas joined the ethnicist Lampung Sai, the main opponent to the pencaksilat organizations Paku Banten and TTKKDH 43 . In Banten, BPPKB conveys ethnic ideology to enforce its actions and Pendekar Banten uses religious arguments to take part on socio-political life. Regionalist groups support from local elites but also from national political actors, as a way to form competitive power to the religious organizations that constitute political support bases. This divide-torule-strategy can sometimes be accompanied by fusions between Islamist and regionalist ideologies. FBR particularly embodied this association 44 and FPI tries in many ways to operate the same concentration of militancy references. The studies concerning the formation of local ethnicities' ideology and its use by the New Order's centralistic State provide a diachronic point of view on the logics of continuity of the local aristocratic rules 45 . The cultural characteristics that are exploited enable to examine hierarchical relations in the informal political networks and they help to understand why they can be legitimate for local communities. It brings to wider historical and sociological considerations about the civil society's perception of ideological discourses that were mobilized under the colonial rule to curb the local cultures into their folkloric aspects and to control customary law. These discourses were reshaped during the national struggle for independence to unify heterogenic cultures. Later, the New Order regime used it to build a hyper centralistic State, and it serves nowadays to patrimonial networks that reproduce this power centralism at the local level. The representatives (tokoh masyarakat) of the local authority are highly influential on the communities and they play key functions on the diffusion of these ideologies. Through complex political affiliations, negotiations and contestations play, they endeavor the role of intermediaries in intra and inter community relations as well as between communities and both regional and national authorities. Their actions take place in highly diverse spheres, as election process, agrarian land distribution, trades implantation and management, microfinance and cooperatives projects, high studies access, professional opportunities and matrimonial alliances. Consequently, if they are involved in underworld networks they can legitimize the political position of those parallel groups. Organizations like Pendekar Banten, BPPKB and Paku Banten conscientiously maintain the low level of education of the citizens, they control the media and they prevent the rise of a political educated middle class. On the other hand, they are central to the communities to maintain strong social coherence and to build strategies aiming to take best advantage of political and power contexts. Thus, since the pre organizations is often proportional to the fragility of social links, their study can help to understand the resilience of local communities when facing external networks pressures. Conclusion: studying Indonesian politics from the bottom Two decades after the beginning of Reformasi, Indonesian power relations are still dominated by informal and interpersonal main actors of this nexus are situated simultaneously in social, economical and political spheres and then cumulate a set of multiform capital. In this power panorama, civil militias appear as intermediaries between civil society, the administration and the government. As semi mediate the relations between the different political levels of society: different kinds of elites, the growing middle class and the popular fragments of the hey prevent the rise of a political educated middle class. On the other hand, they are central to the communities to maintain strong social coherence and to build strategies aiming to take best advantage of political and power contexts. Thus, since the presence of intermediary organizations is often proportional to the fragility of social links, their study can help to understand the resilience of local communities when facing : Representatives of BPPKB in Pandeglang, holding the banner of the organization (2011) Conclusion: studying Indonesian politics from the bottom Two decades after the beginning of Reformasi, Indonesian power relations are still dominated by informal and interpersonal relationship. The main actors of this nexus are situated simultaneously in social, economical and political spheres and then cumulate a set of multiform capital. In this power panorama, civil militias appear as intermediaries between civil society, the inistration and the government. As semi-institutionalized organs, they mediate the relations between the different political levels of society: different kinds of elites, the growing middle class and the popular fragments of the population. By their transversal structures, the civil militias indicate porosity between these social strata but in the same time they participate to their fixation. 46 At the crossroads of these militias, the martial arts groups play an important role as initiation bases for the activist masses and they represent legitimating levers for their representatives and contractors. The cases I have discussed here in South Sumatra and West Java show that the regional civil militias must be understood through regional comparison and thanks to a national level perspective. This approach enables to point out major changes that occurred in the course of the decentralization and democratization processes. With decentralization, the loss of supra regional control resulted in different kinds of processes. In Lampung it enabled Yayasan TTKDH and Paku Banten to gain autonomy toward Banten's political parallel networks. In Banten it permitted the main civil militias' representatives to reach high-rank political positions while the security sector was conquered by new organizations like BPPKB. This organization found the possibility to develop beyond the province, in Jakarta and West Java.
This study also indicates that the civil militias benefit from the support of the central government's officials, as it was shown at the Reformasi beginning by their collaboration with national-level paramilitary groups, like Satria Muda Indonesia and Pamswakarsa. More recently, the strengthening of Pemuda Pancasila (which is finishing the construction of a big buildings complex near the police central office in Serang) indicates a strong resilience of the collusion phenomenon between the power local representatives and national political figures of the dominant oligarchy. In the context of the "post anti-Ahok" events and in prevision of the next presidential elections, the study of these civil militias points out how political parallel networks compete for power, beyond the parties and political chairs. Thus, my objective here is to stress the need for the comprehension of the tension within martial arts organizations, like the regional Indonesian Pencak Silat People (Masyarakat Pencak Silat Indonesia, MASPI) led by reformist elites in Bandung, or the national federation IPSI headed by Prabowo Subianto. This kind of study may provide significant insights on the dynamics that connect together authority leaders, regional and national administration, political representatives and a large part of the Indonesian population.
